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TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM AND "REASONABLE"
APPROACH TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION:
CURRENT TRENDS IN THE ADOPTION OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AND ITS POTENTIAL




One day through the primeval wood
A calf walked home as good calves should:
But made a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail as all calves do.
And from that day, o'er hill and glade,
Through those old woods a path was made.
And many men wound in and out,
And dodged and turned and bent about,
And uttered words of righteous wrath
Because 'twas such a crooked path;
But still they followed-do not laugh-
The first migrations of that calf,
And men two centuries and a half
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Trod in the footsteps of that calf.
For thus such reverence is lent
To well-established precedent.
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
Who saw the first primeval calf'
N HIS FOREWORD to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
lLiability, Professor Geoffrey Hazard (Director, American Law
Institute2 ("ALI")) referred to a famous article prepared by Pro-
fessor Max Radin in which the Professor excerpted from the
above poem, and analogized the development of the common
law to "the twisting and sometimes misdirected course of a run-
away calf."3 According to Professor Hazard the development of
the common law of products liability in the United States since
the issuance in 1965 of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts has been similarly misdirected. One of the intended re-
sults of the American Law Institute's work in developing the new
Restatement of the law of products liability was to "straighten"
the course of the law's development.4 Indeed, Professor Hazard
readily acknowledges that the text of the Restatement (Third)
I Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf 32 CORNELL L. Q. 137, 137-38 (1946) (quot-
ing SAM WALTER Foss, WHIFFS FROM WILD MEADOWS (1905)).
2 The American Law Institute is a private body that was organized in 1923.
According to its charter, the ALI's purpose is "to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the
better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and
scientific legal work." See American Law Institute, About The American Law Institute
(visited August 24, 2000) <http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm>. The ALI's bylaws
authorize an elected membership of 3000, consisting of'judges, lawyers, and law
teachers from all areas of the United States as well as some foreign countries,
selected on the basis of professional achievement and demonstrated interest in
the improvement of the law." Id. Historically, approximately every thirty years
the ALI prepares a new restatement of the law of torts (among other topic areas).
See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Guide to
its Highlights, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 85, 86 (1998). Although these restatements of
the law do not have the force of law, they traditionally have been influential on
the courts of the United States. The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability were Professor James Henderson, Jr. of Cornell Law
School and Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School, who were assisted in the
preparation of this Restatement by a twenty-person advisory committee com-
posed of respected and distinguished judges, law professors, and practicing mem-
bers of the plaintiff and defense bars. Id. at 85.
3 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD-
ucTs LIABILI'Y at XVI (1998).
4 Id.
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"'goes beyond the law' as the law otherwise would stand" in its
attempt to "straighten" the course of products liability law.5
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (herein-
after referred to as "Restatement (Third)" or "Restatement"),
the product of over five years of work, was adopted by the di-
verse ALI membership without a dissenting vote at its annual
meeting in May, 1997. This Restatement unquestionably seeks
to clarify and to constrict the scope of products liability law, as
that law has evolved in the United States over the last thirty-five
years. Beginning in 1965, Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (hereinafter referred to as "Restatement (Sec-
ond)"), which was the first recognition by the ALI of "privity-
free" strict liability for sellers of defective products, was adopted
by most states as the conceptual foundation of their products
liability law. From its inception, however, Section 402A lacked
the detail necessary to guide the doctrine beyond its infancy.
The extensive lack of doctrinal coverage, along with a variety of
ambiguities, resulted in a patchwork of conflicting and compet-
ing interpretations in the products liability law of the various
states. The original objective of Section 402A "was to eliminate
privity so that a user or consumer, without having to establish
negligence, could bring an action against a manufacturer, as
well as against any other member of a distributive chain that had
sold a product containing a manufacturing defect."6 In applica-
tion, however, much confusion arose from the failure of Section
402A to define precisely what was meant by the ambiguous
terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" products, as
well as by the failure of Section 402A to directly address liability
for inadequate warnings and instructions.7
Over the years the courts of the individual states were left to
give meaning to terms and to address issues that were not cov-
ered by the Restatement (Second), and as a result this patch-
work of competing and often conflicting approaches developed.
Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) now addresses issues that
the ALI did not contemplated in 1965, and therefore represents
5 Id.
6 Introduction to RESTATEMENT (TI-nRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY at 3
(1998) (emphasis added).
7 George W. Conk, Is there a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
uct Liability, 109 YALE LJ. 1087 (2000) (discussing the objective in Restatement
(Third) "to resolve the problem of the meaning of the word 'defect,' a problem
that has haunted the law of torts since section 402A of the ALI's 1965 Restate-
ment (Second) ushered in the era of strict liability for defective products").
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an almost total overhaul of the Restatement (Second) as it con-
cerns the liability of commercial product manufacturers, sellers,
and distributors for harm caused by their products.8 Seeking to
cover all the contours of the modern strict liability doctrine
across the multitude of state jurisdictions, the Restatement
(Third) is poised to have a far greater impact on the develop-
ment and direction of products liability law than the numerous
state legislative efforts that have taken place in recent years.'
However, this overhaul of products liability law by the ALI has
not avoided criticism from members of the bar. The primary
resistance to the Restatement (Third) arises from the ALI's at-
tempt to interject (or as many perceive it, re-interject) negli-
gence principles into strict products liability cases, where
manufacturers and distributors theoretically are to be held lia-
ble for "defective" products without proof of fault.") That the
Restatement (Third) has gone beyond merely "restating" the
law also has not gone unnoticed by many of the highest state
and federal courts, one of which recently observed that: "The
Third Restatement must be approached with considerable cau-
tion. The drafters of the Third Restatement have attempted not
merely to restate existing doctrine but to move it in what they
consider to be the right direction.""
With this introduction, our article in Section II will summa-
rize and discuss selected provisions of the Restatement (Third)
that may be of particular interest to those involved in the field of
aviation products and related litigation. Section III will follow
with a survey and discussion of the reactions of the highest
courts of the states to the Restatement (Third). Finally, Section
IV will address some of the Restatement's provisions that are
likely to have the greatest impact on aviation litigation.
8 1(1.
9 For an up-to-date summary of the status of tort reform efforts in the individ-
tial states regarding products liability law, see the American Tort Reform Associa-
tion ("ATRA") website. ATRA (visited August 24, 2000) <http//www.atra.org/
issues.flml?id'31>. The website also includes a telephone number to obtain
model reform legislation and a current list of states that have enacted products
liability reforms.
10 See, e.g., Conk, supra note 7, at 1087 ("The Restatement (Third) thus heralds
the end of strict liability for product sellers, grounding products-liability law's key
concept-the defective product-in the law of negligence").
11 Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d 534, 549 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)
(citing Martin A. Kotler, Reconceptualizing Strict Liability Tort: An Overview, 50
VAND. L. REV. 555, 603 (1997)); see generally William A. Drier, The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability and New Jersey Law-Not Quite Perfect Together, 50
RUIGERs L. REv.2059 (1998).
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II. SUMMARY OF SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Restatement (Third)12 sets forth the basic rule of liability in
Section 1 as follows:
§ 1. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by
Defective Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who sells or distributes a defective product is sub-
ject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect. '
This basic liability rule is similar to the rule in the Restatement
(Second), 4 Subsection (2) (a) provided for a "product-based" in-
quiry where liability for a defective product would be imposed
regardless of the reasonableness of the conduct of the manufac-
turer or distributor. Subsection (2) (b) eliminated the require-
ment of privity between the seller and the user or consumer of
the product, insofar as the new version does not depart from the
traditional elements necessary for a plaintiff to establish a prod-
ucts liability cause of action; that is, a seller engaged in the busi-
ness of selling, a defective product, causation, and personal
injury or property damage. The most notable difference in the
Restatement (Third)'s primary liability provision is the disap-
pearance of references implicit and otherwise to manufacturing
defect claims, that (as discussed previously) were the historical
12 RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY' (1998) (hereinafter
"RESTATEMENT (TiIRD)"). For background information, the authors direct your
particular attention to the lengthy Reporters' Notes that are included in the Re-
statement (Third); these notes contain an exhaustive and up-to-date compen-
dium of the law of products liability in each state jurisdiction.
13 RESTATEMENT (Third) § 1.
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides
as follows:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Hann to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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focus of products liability law. Indeed, even before examining
Section 2 of the Restatement, which defines three types of prod-
uct defects, the Reporters' Note to Section 1 makes apparent
that the Restatement (Third) addresses one of the major per-
ceived shortcomings of the Restatement (Second) by endorsing
the now widespread and universally accepted notion that defects
are not limited to manufacturing defects, but instead can be of
several types. ' 5
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) is likely the greatest de-
parture and expansion from the Restatement (Second), and
therefore is one of its most controversial provisions.' This sec-
tion, which is the theoretical cornerstone of the Restatement
(Third), defines in functional terms what have evolved as the
three traditional types of product defects: manufacturing de-
fects, design defects, and instructions or warnings defects:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribu-
tion, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design,
or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings.
A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exer-
cised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instruc-
tions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a prede-
cessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1, rep. note 1 ("Abundant authority recognizes the
division of product defects into manufacturing defects, design defects, and de-
fects based on inadequate instructions or warnings.") (citations omitted).
16 See W. Kennedy Simpson et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liabil-
ity, and Consumer Law, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 553, 569 (2000) (discussing the
"mixed" results that have occurred as courts begin to apply Section 2 of the Re-
statement ).
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of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasona-
bly safe. 7
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Section 2, because of
its departure from the law currently followed by many states, is
ALI's choice of standards for determining whether a product is
defective in design or defective due to inadequate instructions
or warnings.' Although the Restatement (Third) retains the
"pure" form of strict liability for manufacturing defects, under
which a manufacturer or seller is strictly liable if a product devi-
ates from its intended design, it adopts a "risk-utility" standard
for design and warning defects."9 Doing so, it rejects the ambig-
uous "defective condition, unreasonable dangerous" terminol-
ogy of Section 402A, which courts have struggled to apply.
Concluding that design defect and warning cases "require deter-
minations that the product could reasonably have been made
safer by a better design or instruction or warning,"2 the ALL has
made very clear that subsections (b) and (c) of Section 2 essen-
tially rely on a "reasonableness test" that historically has been
used in determining whether a manufacturer or seller has been
negligent.21
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 (emphasis added). Indeed, the traditional tort
terms "strict liability" and "negligence" do not appear in any of the sections of the
Restatement, although they are discussed at length in the comments and report-
ers' notes.
18 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 88 (finding that there is "no issue that brought
about more debate in the entire Restatement" than this part of Section 2).
19 Selecting a "risk-utility" analysis as the governing standard for product defec-
tiveness, the ALl rejected the cornerstone of the design defect analysis in many
states-the "consumer expectations" test. A consumer expectation test bases re-
covery "on the disappointment of consumer expectations regarding safe product
performance," and as a result has been said to be based on "intuition." James A.
Henderson,Jr., Product Design Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L.
REv. 1, 12-14 (1999). Nevertheless, the ALl retained the consumer expectations
test as one of the many factors that may be "relevant in determining whether the
omission of a reasonable alternative design renders a product not reasonably
safe." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f; see also id., cmt. g. ("Some courts ... use
the term 'reasonable consumer expectations' as an equivalent of 'proof of a rea-
sonable, safer design alternative,' since reasonable consumers have a right to ex-
pect product designs that conform to [a] reasonableness standard . . . Other
courts, allowing an inference of defect to be drawn when the incident is of a kind
that ordinarily would occur as a result of product defect, observe that products
that fail when put to their manifestly intended use disappoint reasonable con-
sumer expectations.").
21) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. a.
21 See Conk, supra note 7, at 1087. The risk utility analysis is "a negligence-
based approach championed by John Wade, the successor to William Prosser as
Reporter for the Restatement of Torts." Id. at 1087-288.
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Under the risk-utility test, the determinative question "is
whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable
cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative de-
sign . . . rendered the product not reasonably safe."22 Under-
scoring that reasonableness considerations abound, the ALl
notes in the comments to Section 2 that the "comparison be-
tween an alternative design and the product design that caused
the injury [is] undertaken [in most instances] from the view-
point of a reasonable person. 23
As stated in Comment d to Section 2, it is the plaintiffs bur-
den to "prove that such a reasonable alternative [design] was, or
reasonably could have been, available at time of sale or distribu-
tion. The requirement for providing a reasonable alternative
design constitutes a significant change in the jurisprudence of
many states, and therefore is another of the more controversial
provisions in the Restatement (Third) ;25 however, to soften the
burden of proof on plaintiffs, the reasonable alternative design
requirement for proof of defect is not exclusive. As discussed
below, Sections 3 and 4 of the Restatement provide alternative
means for establishing liability on the basis of defective design
even if a reasonable alternative design has not been proven. 6
2 2 RESrATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. d. The test has been broken into "[t]he op-
erative questions... (1) Was a reasonable alternative design available at the time
of sale or distribution that would have reduced or avoided the plaintiff's risk of
harm? and (2) Did the failure to adopt such an alternative render the design in
question 'not reasonably safe'?" James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causa-
tion, 88 GEO. LJ. 659, 666 (2000).
23 Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. d. The ALl notes that this reasonableness stan-
dard is the same as that traditionally used in negligence cases, and that "policy
reasons . .. support its use in the products liability context." Id.
21 Id.
25 See id., rep. note to cmt. d. (discussing at length the tests in various jurisdic-
tions for design defect, including whether proof of reasonable alternative design
is required). See also Alan J. Lazarus et. al., Recent Developments in Products, General
Liability, and Consumer Law, 33 TORT & INS. L.I. 605, 606 (1998) (stating the re-
quirement that Plaintiff must introduce evidence of a reasonable alternative de-
sign is "more controversial" a adopting the risk utility analysis); Schwartz, supra
note 2, at 88 (claiming plaintiffs attorneys "do not want [the] 'black letter bur-
den"' of being required to prove a reasonable alternative design exists).
211 "Sections 3 and 4 and Comment e to § 2 provide approaches to the estab-
lishment of defective design other than that provided in § 2(b)." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 2 cmt. b. In Comment e, the ALl notes that some courts have indi-
cated that designs may be so "manifestly unreasonable . . . that liability should
attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design." Id. cmt. e. Al-
though some observers have written that Comment e should not be read as ne-
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Section 3, entitled "Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Infer-
ence of Product Defect," allows the fact-finder to draw an infer-
ence, from circumstantial evidence, that the harm to person or
property was caused by a product defect and was not, in the par-
ticular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect
existing at the time of sale or distribution.2 7 Thus, under this
section, more commonly referred to as the "indeterminate prod-
uct defect test," a manufacturer can be liable for a design defect
even without proof of a specific defect. Similar to the operation
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, liability can be established
under Section 3 if the incident was of a kind that normally oc-
curs as a result of product defect, and if the incident was not
solely the result of other causes. 8 In its comments, the ALI
noted that Section 3 likely will have its greatest application in
manufacturing defect cases. '
Section 4 provides another alternative to the "reasonable al-
ternative design" requirement of Section 2 in cases where there
has been noncompliance with an applicable product safety stat-
ute or administrative regulation."' Section 4 is a theoretical
gating plaintiff's burden of showing an alternative design, they have recognized
that the provision is sufficiently confusing that such may be the interpretation by
some courts. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 89. ("If comment e is weighed against
the black letter of the section and sound public policy is properly presented and
argued by counsel, and carefully considered by fair-mindedjudges, it should have
no practical effect on the development of the law.").
27 Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect,
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a prod-
uct defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific
defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution
28 Id. The ALI states that Section 3 "traces its historical antecedents to the law
of negligence, which has long recognized that an inference of negligence may be
drawn in cases where the defendant's negligence is the best explanation for the
cause of an accident .... ." Id. cmt. a. See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 91
("[T]he section is similar to the old res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In effect, if 'the
defect speaks for itself,' it can be proven circumstantially.").
29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. b.
30 Section 4 of the Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
4. Noncompliance and Compliance with Product Safety Statutes or Regulations
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or
warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or ad-
ministrative regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks
sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation; and
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counterpart to the negligence per se doctrine of absolute liabil-
ity, and indeed, the comments make clear that the typical con-
siderations under the negligence per se doctrine including,
whether the subject harm was a type of harm that the regulation
was intended to prevent, are necessary elements to establish lia-
bility under Section 4(a). However, extending beyond the con-
tours of traditional negligence per se, Section 4(b) addresses the
effect of manufacturer compliance with applicable statutes and
regulations. The Restatement (Third) takes the position, consis-
tent with classic "compliance with standards" doctrine, that com-
pliance with relevant standards and regulations is not an
absolute defense as a matter of law to product defect claims, but
rather is "properly considered in determining whether the prod-
uct is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by
the statute or regulation .... ,", Section 4(b) implicitly adopts
the view that most product safety statutes or regulations, such as
the Federal Aviation Administration's Federal Aviation Regula-
tions ("FARs"), are "minimum standards. '312
Other notable aspects of the Restatement (Third) include
Sections 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 17. In Section 5, the ALI has
addressed the liability of component part manufacturers, one of
the many topics not addressed adequately in the Restatement
(Second). Under Section 5, component part manufacturers can
be held liable if the plaintiff establishes that the component is
defective, and if such defect caused the injury or damage."
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or adminis-
trative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is
defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regula-
tion, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of prod-
uct defect.
:S Id.
32 Id. cmt. e (noting that "[s]ubsection b reflects the traditional view that the
standards set by most product safety statutes or regulations generally are only
minimum standards.").
'- Section 5 of the Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
§ 5. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product Components for Harm Caused
by Products into which Components Are Integrated
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product compo-
nents who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to per-
sons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if:
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter, and the defect
causes the harm; or
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the
integration of the component into the design of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective, as de-
fined in this Chapter; and
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However, consistent with the approach followed by most courts,
a component part manufacturer will not be liable under Section
5 merely because the plaintiff has proven a defect in the product
into which the component has been incorporated.3 4 The provi-
sions of Section 5 confirm that a component manufacturer's lia-
bility cannot be based on a product that is defective because of
the defective incorporation of the component parts, unless the
component part manufacturer substantially participated in the
component's integration into the final product.
Section 10, which defines liability on the basis of post-sale fail-
ure to warn, addresses another major perceived deficiency in
the Restatement (Second) and represents an important depar-
ture from the existing law in many states. 5 Section 10, which is
considered by many to be one of the most "plaintiff-friendly"
provisions of the Restatement (Third), creates a duty to issue
post-sale warnings that is more limited than the duty to provide
warnings at the time of original sale. 36 FN Perhaps the most
noteworthy aspect of this provision is its apparent establishment
of liability for a recall campaign that is unreasonably stopped
short of completion. Under Section 10, a post-sale duty to warn
for a commercial product seller or distributor exists if:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the prod-
uct poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property;
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identi-
fied and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of
any harm;
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm
34 Id.
35 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 92 ("Some, but not all jurisdictions currently im-
pose [a postsale failure to warn] duty.").
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)§ 11 (emphasis added). The ALI's views on product
recall are less expansive than on the post-sale duty to warn. The product recall
provisions are included in Section 11 of the Restatement (Third), which provides
as follows:
§ 11. Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Post-Sale
Failure to Recall Product
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is sub-
ject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the seller's failure to
recall a product after the time of sale or distribution if:
(a) (1) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or administrative
regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the product; or
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall requirement under Subsec-
tion (a) (1), undertakes to recall the product; and
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable person in recalling the
product.
2000] 139
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(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted
on by those to whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden
of providing a warning. 7
Recognizing that the cost of communicating with purchasers
years after the sale can be "daunting," the ALI chose to follow
the "growing body of decisional and statutory law impos[ing]
such a duty," but then to limit the duty to those circumstances in
which the risk is "substantial." 8  Similar to the standard for
warning defects at the time of sale in Section 2, the standard for
post-sale duty to warn is one of reasonableness:'
Section 15, dealing with causation, is considered by many to
be one of the biggest disappointments of the Restatement
(Third) because it fails to promulgate specific causation rules.4"
Instead, the provision broadly declares that: "Whether a product
defect caused harm to persons or property is determined by the
prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort."'"
The ALI found that the causation principles for products liabil-
ity "are the same as those governing tort"4 2 and generally are
consistent with the causation principles and standards of the in-
dividual states. Although causation was not thoroughly defined
in the Restatement (Third), there is a "synergism and dynamic
tension [that exists] between the risk-utility liability standard
and proximate causation."4" It has been suggested that the
37 RESTATEMENT (Ti-iiRD) § 10 (emphasis added). All four conditions must be
met for there to be a post-sale duty to warn.
- Id. cmt. a ("[A]n unbounded post-sale duty to warn would impose tinaccept-
able burdens on product sellers.").
39 Id. cmt. b ("The standard governing the liability of the seller is objective:
whether a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning.").
40 See generally Henderson, supra note 22, at 661 (commenting that as a former
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) he "did not fully appreciate the interactive
role of defect and causation when drafting the project").
41 RESTATEMEN (Ti uR) § 15.
412 id. cmt. a. Basic tort causation principles include: cause in fact, proximate
causation and "result within the risk" proximate causation. Henderson, supra
note 22, at 663-66. Cause in fact "requires the plaintiff to show the conduct of
the defendant ... was a necessary 'but for' condition to the plaintiff's harm." Id.
at 663. Proximate causation "requires the plaintiff to show that, even assuming
actual causation, the negligent aspect of the defendant's conduct was a necessary,
'but-for' condition of the plaintiffs harm." Id. at 664. For the final factor, 'result
within-the-risk' proximate causation, "the plaintiff is required to show that, even
assuming that the first two elements ... have been established, the harm result-
ing from defendant's negligent conduct was reasonably foreseeable at the time
defendant acted." Id.
4"' Henderson, supra note 22, at 661.
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"consumer expectations test collapses defect and causation ...
[whereas] the risk utility test for design defect properly sepa-
rates the design defect issue from the proximate causation is-
sue."44 The risk utility test, as a result, may improve courts'
future analysis of causation. 5
Section 16 deals with enhancement of harm, another topic
that Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) did not address.
This doctrine, commonly known in aviation law as the
"crashworthiness doctrine,"" is a significant source of potential
liability for manufacturers.47 Section 16 imposes liability if a
"product is defective at the time of commercial sale ... and the
defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm
beyond that which would have resulted from other
causes .... ,,4 Section 16 also addresses the extent of the seller's
44 Id. at 678-79. For example, in the consumer expectation test the jury must
decide:
Whether a reasonable consumer would have been expected to be
harmed in the same manner in which the plaintiff was harmed
when using the product in the same manner that caused the plain-
tiff's injury. Once the jury decides that the product is defective be-
cause it allowed the plaintiff to suffer a harm that a reasonable
consumer would not have expected, in effect the jury has con-
cluded that the design is defective because it allowed the accident
to happen.
45 Id. at 678 ("What has escaped the attention of almost all commentators and
courts ... is that the consumer expectations test totally eviscerates but-for proxi-
mate causation as a discrete issue in a defective design case.").
46 In the classic aviation context, the crashworthiness doctrine refers to a plain-
tiffs argument that "if the vehicle [or plane] had been designed differently, [his
or her] injury would have been less severe." See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 94.
47 Alan J. Lazarus et. al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability, and
Consumer Law, 34 TORT & INS. L. J. 573, 588 (1999) (discussing what "a fruitful
source of controversy" the crashworthiness doctrine causes).
48 Section 16 of the Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
§ 16. Increased Harm Due to Product Defect
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or
other distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increas-
ing the plaintiffs harm beyond that which would have resulted
from other causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the
increased harm.
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have
resulted from other causes in the absence of the product defect,
the product seller's liability is limited to the increased harm attribu-
table solely to the product defect.
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection
(b) of the harm that would have resulted in the absence of the
product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiff's
harm attributable to the defect and other causes.
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liability, stating that the "product seller's liability is limited to
the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect. '49
However, in a provision that generally is favorable for plaintiffs,
if there is no proof of the harm that would have resulted even
absent the "crashworthiness" defect, then the seller "is liable for
all of the plaintiffs harm attributable to the defect and other
causes."'5 The ALI's comments confirm that in the context of
these "increased harm" design defect claims, the plaintiff still
"must establish that a reasonable alternative design would have
reduced the plaintiffs harm."'" Of equal significance is the in-
corporation of comparative fault principles in subsection (d) of
Section 16; indeed, the comments indicate that courts may take
into account that the plaintiffs conduct also caused the acci-
dent or that the plaintiff failed to "mitigate" the harm, for exam-
ple, by wearing a seatbelt.52
Section 17 promulgates rules for the apportionment of re-
sponsibility between and among the parties. In order to under-
stand the reasoning behind Section 17, a brief review of
historical context is necessary. 53 When Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) was issued in 1965, the principle of contrib-
utory negligence, under which a plaintiff's claim was completely
barred if the plaintiff was at fault in any way, was the overwhelm-
ing majority rule in the United States. In 1965 very few courts
had applied what are known today as comparative fault princi-
(d) A seller of a defective product that is held liable for part of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (b), or all of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (c), is jointly and
severally liable or severally liable with other parties who bear legal
responsibility for causing the harm, determined by applicable rules
of joint and several liability.
49 Id. § 16(b). Notably, such limited liability is applicable only if "proof sup-
ports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in
the absence of the product defect." Id.
50 Id. § 16 (c) a. Illustration number 6 discusses an example in which
"George" proves that the defect was a substantial factor in increasing the harm,
but is unable to quantify the alleged additional harm. If neither party introduces
proof as to the proper apportionment of liability, then defendant is liable for all
of George's injuries.
51 Id. cmt. b. The comments state that the alternative design not only must
prevent the type of additional harm that plaintiff incurred, but also must "in-
crease the overall safety of the product." Id.
52 Id. cmt. f. The statement that a court may consider that the plaintiff failed
to wear a seatbelt is somewhat surprising, in light of the large body of case law
(particularly in the aviation context) that has rejected this position. See id.
53 See generally Schwartz, supra note 2, at 95-96.
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ples in products liability cases. 54 Because of what was perceived
as the harsh rule of claim bar under contributory negligence
principles, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) adopted a
compromise position-that is, under Section 402A, contributory
negligence of a plaintiff was not a defense, but assumption of
risk by the plaintiff was a complete defense.55
The liability landscape today, approximately thirty-five years
later, has changed radically. All but four states56 and the District
of Columbia have adopted some form of comparative fault prin-
ciples in lieu of the rule of contributory negligence, and most
do so in the context of products liability cases.57 Accordingly,
Section 17 of the Restatement (Third), which adopts the appli-
cation of comparative fault principles in products liability cases,
is an endorsement of the majority view. 8 Under Section 17, ti-
tled "Apportionment of Responsibility Between or Among Plain-
tiff, Sellers and Distributors of Defective Products, and Others,"
the fact-finder will be allowed to consider plaintiffs failure to
satisfy the appropriate standard of care as follows:
(a) A plaintiffs recovery of damages for harm caused by a prod-
uct defect may be reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff com-
bines with the product defect to cause the harm and the
plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules
establishing appropriate standards of care.
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection
(a) and the apportionment of plaintiffs recovery among multi-
ple defendants are governed by generally applicable rules appor-
tioning responsibility.59
In essence, the Restatement (Third) adopts comparative fault
principles, but then cross references and incorporates the par-
54 Id. at 96.
5 See id. ("[Restatement] Reporters Prosser & Wade made an interesting, Solo-
mon-like judgment. They decided that contributory negligence would not be a
defense, but that assumption of risk ... would be a complete defense.").
56 The four states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. See
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 96.
57 See id. In his later writings, Dean Wade, one of the reporters of the Second
Restatement, strongly supported the application of comparative fault principles
in products liability cases. Id. at n.23.
58 It is important to note that the ALl has an ongoing project to address the
topic of apportionment of liability; the content of Section 17 and its comments
are likely to be superceded by this ALI apportionment of liability project when it
is completed. See id. at 96-97.
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17.
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ticular rules of the various state jurisdictions. 6° Section 17 also
addresses the relevance of evidence directed toward plaintiff's
product misuse, alteration or modification, noting that such
conduct is relevant on three issues: defect; causation; and, as in
Section 17, comparative responsibility."' The ALI explains in
the comments that a plaintiff's failure to discover a product de-
fect is relevant only if the defendant can show that such failure
constituted a failure to comply with the standard of reasonable
care that generally is applicable to a plaintiff's conduct."2
III. SURVEY OF THE INITIAL REACTIONS OF THE
HIGHEST COURTS OF THE STATES
Despite its infancy,"3 the Restatement (Third) already is being
woven into the fabric of products liability law of many states.
Although the Restatement (Third) has been cited favorably and
at times widely criticized at all levels of state courts, 4 this
60 Id. cmt. b ("The apportionment of responsibility principles as they have de-
veloped in each jurisdiction should be applied to products liability cases."). Until
ALI produces a proposed draft for this section, the law as it has developed in the
individual states will continue to apply. See supra note 57.
61 Restatement (Third) § 17 cmt. c. The comment confirms that the ALI did
not take a position as to which party has the burden of proof regarding conduct
that may constitute misuse, modification, or product alteration.
62 hl. cnt. d. ("In general, a plaintiff has no reason to expect that a new prod-
uct contains a defect and would have little reason to be on guard to discover it.").
63 The Restatement (Third) was adopted by the ALI, in final form, on May 20,
1997. There were 12 earlier draft versions, including the Proposed Final Draft
(1997).
64 See, e.g., Livingston v. Marie Callenders, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th 830, 839 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting the Restatement (Third) stance on liability for defective
warnings regarding allergic reactions to products); Koss Constr. v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 960 P.2d 255 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that Section 21 of the Restate-
ment (Third) endorses the East River economic loss doctrine); Grudnoske v.
Determan Welding & Tank Serv., Inc., Action No. C3-99-359, 1999 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1041 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing the Restatement (Third) for proposi-
tion that non-manufacturing sellers and distributors are subject to products liabil-
ity claims); Norwest Bank New Mexico N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 981 P.2d 1215,
1220 n.1 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting the Restatement (Third)'s standards for
the apportionment of liability due to the fault of the driver in automobile
crashworthiness cases, and stating that "[i] t remains to be seen what effect, if any,
[Section 16] will have on New Mexico law"); New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
Inc., 688 N.Y.S. 2d 23, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (citing the Restatement (Third)'s
rejection of the product line theory of successor liability to support its own re-
fusal to follow that doctrine); Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 20-
21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (dissenting opinion arguing for the adoption of Section
8 (liability of seller of used products) of the Restatement (Third)); Lecy v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing the
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section will focus primarily on the highest courts of the
states. 
6 5
Federal courts have addressed and made extensive citations to
the ALI's recent efforts; however, their role in state adoption or
rejection of the new standards primarily is one of observation.66
Even where the law of the state is unsettled, the federal courts
are not fertile grounds for change. Indeed, at least two United
States Courts of Appeals have been unable to predict whether a
state's Supreme Court would follow the Restatement (Third) as
it pertained to a point of unsettled law in that state.6 7 Neverthe-
Restatement (Third) in support of the proposition that reasonableness is a factor
in the design defect inquiry).
65 The Restatement (Third) has been cited in significant fashion by twenty of
the highest courts in the states at the time of this article's preparation. The Re-
statement (Third) also has been cited by many federal courts, including the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 120
S.Ct. 1913 (2000).
66 When interpreting the products liability laws of a given state, the federal
courts usually are left to "noting" the Restatement (Third)'s consistency (or in-
consistency) with the settled law of the state. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus.
Prod., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting the Restatement (Third)
supports the proposition that when "an integrated product is not itself defective,
the maker of the component is not liable for injury that results from a defect in
the integrated product"); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting the Restatement (Third)'s stance on the learned intermediary doctrine);
Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 552 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that
Louisiana products liability law and the Restatement (Third) require a "similar
risk-utility analysis"); Port Authority of New York & NewJersey v. Arcadian Corp.,
189 F.3d 305, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the New Jersey Supreme Court's
earlier reliance on a tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) in holding that
generally a component part manufacturer owed no duty to the plaintiff for any
danger posed by an integrated device); Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608,
612 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting the Restatement (Third)'s denouncement of com-
mentj to Section 402A as being consistent with Maryland law); National Bank of
Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 608 n.9 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing the
Restatement (Third) for the proposition that "products liability" generally refers
to design, manufacturing, and warning defect claims); Kampen v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 316 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting the Texas Su-
preme Court's earlier reliance on the Restatement (Third)'s warning require-
ments in Section 2); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 845 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (noting that under the Restatement (Third), and consistent with the laws
of the District of Columbia, a manufacturer cannot avoid liability for a design
defect by incorporating a warning). But see Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151
F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir. 1998) (deciding to apply "section 5 of the Restatement of
Torts, Third: Products Liability, as [the court] believe[d] the Texas Supreme
Court would.").
67 Unable to predict whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court would adopt
the Restatement (Third)'s version of the crashworthiness doctrine, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified to the New Hampshire Su-
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less, the federal courts' preliminary references confirm the sig-
nificance of ALI's product 8 and lend support to our belief that
the Restatement (Third) will have a significant influence in es-
tablishing a more uniform national products liability law.69
The Restatement (Third) already is having a notable impact
on the products liability jurisprudence of many states. Even
though many of the cases that have afforded the highest courts
of the states the opportunity to review the Restatement were liti-
gated prior to the adoption of the final version of the Restate-
ment, and correspondingly, the Restatement may not have been
the subject of extensive briefing, it nevertheless has made its way
into published opinions of the highest courts in about one-third
of the states.
For the purpose of this discussion, the states' treatment of the
Restatement (Third) is grouped into three categories. The first
category consists of those states that expressly have incorporated
various sections of the Restatement into their law. These states
include Iowa, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. The second cate-
gory consists of Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, and Tennessee, states that expressly have rejected various
provisions or principles of the Restatement. The final category
preme Court the issue of whether the plaintiff bears the burden of defining and
quantifying the alleged enhanced injuries. Trull v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 187
F.3d 88, 100-03 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
149 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (refusing to adopt or consider the Restatement
(Third) because "[a federal court's] function is not to formulate a tenet which
we, as free agents, might think wise, but to ascertain, as best we can, the rule that
the state's highest tribunal would likely follow"); Liriano v. Hobrat Corp ., 132
F.3d 124, 130-32 (2d Cir. 1998) (certifying to the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York the question of whether "manufacturer liability exist[s] under a failure
to warn theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense would pre-
clude liability under a design defect theory").
13 Even in the tentative draft form, the Restatement (Third) was recognized as
persuasive authority. See Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 95-
1458, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 41268, at *1 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing the ALI's Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2 (1995) as "significant authority" pertaining to the economic loss
doctrine); see also Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir.
1997) (citing Tentative Draft No. 2 for proposition that a manufacturer has no
duty to warn of dangers that are generally known and recognized).
69 The potential influence of a uniform and current Restatement on the incon-
sistent products liability laws of the states is obvious. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co.
v. J. M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 879 (1997) (citing the Proposed Final
Draft, Preliminary Version (Oct. 18, 1996) for the basic statement of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine); Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (lth Cir.
1999) (citing the 1997 Tentative Draft for propositions relating to a defective
warning claim).
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consists of states that have cited and discussed the Restatement
in a significant way, but whose treatment of the Restatement
falls short of an express adoption or rejection. The states in this
final category include Alaska, California, Georgia, Massachu-
setts, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming."°
A. STATES THAT ExPRESSLY HAVE ADOPTED SECTIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
Iowa is one of three states that expressly has adopted a section
of the Restatement (Third). The issue before the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Lovick v. Wil-Richv' was whether the trial court
erred in its instruction to the jury regarding the defendant-man-
ufacturer's post-sale duty to warn.7 2 In concluding that the in-
struction was improper, on the grounds that the court failed to
inform the jury of the "special" circumstances affecting the rea-
sonableness of the manufacturer's conduct, the Iowa Supreme
Court expressly adopted Section 10 of the Restatement (Third),
"including the need to articulate the relevant factors to consider
in determining the reasonableness of providing a warning after
the sale."73 Although Section 10 was consistent, in principle,
with Iowa law, the Iowa Supreme Court's adoption of Section 10
in full, and its corresponding rejection of an Iowa standard jury
instruction, underscores the significance of the Iowa
development."4
70 The authors recognize that the treatment of the Restatement (Third) by
most states could be grouped in this third category, especially when multiple
opinions addressing one or more different sections of the Restatement are con-
sidered. However, to the extent a state has expressly adopted and/or rejected
provisions of the Restatement, its treatment will be discussed in the first and sec-
ond categories only. An example is NewJersey, which has issued numerous opin-
ions adopting, rejecting and treating provisions of the Restatement in other ways.
71 588 N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1999).
7, The trial court had utilized Uniform Jury Instruction 1000.12 to describe a
manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn. Notably, the Iowa Legislature previously
created such a duty in 1986, through the adoption of Iowa's products liability
state-of-the-art defense statute. Id. at 692-93.
73 Id. at 695-96 ("Accordingly, we adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability § 10, including the need to articulate the relevant factors to
consider in determining the reasonableness of providing a warning after sale.").
74 A later opinion from the Iowa Supreme Court cited the Restatement
(Third) as instructive concerning its denouncement of the controversial Com-
mentj to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 590 N.W. 2d 525, 529 (Iowa 1999) (discussing the Restatement (Third)'s
position that Commentj used "unfortunate language" to the extent it has been
2000]
148 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
NewJersey, likewise, expressly has adopted portions of the Re-
statement (Third). In Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey,75 the Supreme Court of NewJersey adopted the "inde-
terminate product defect" test of Section 3.76 After evaluating
Section 3's endorsement of an "intermediate-type approach,"
under which a product defect could be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence 77 as previously adopted in New Jersey in Scan-
lon v. General Motors Corp. (the "Scanlon rule") 78, the court
concluded that such an approach "appears to best serve the in-
terest of all parties and is not inconsistent with the [New Jersey
Products Liability] Act. ''79 In so holding, the court recognized
that Section 3 "permits the jury to draw two inferences: that the
harmful incident was caused by a product defect, and that the
defect was present when the product left the manufacturer's
control.""0 Although the Supreme Court of NewJersey has been
relatively proactive in considering the various provisions of the
Restatement (Third),8' Myrlak is the only decision, to date, that
has expressly incorporated any aspect of the Restatement
(Third) into the products liability laws of that state.
As in Iowa and New Jersey, the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land also expressly has adopted a section of the Restatement
interpreted to mean that an adequate warning can negate a product's defective
design).
7. 723 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1999).
76 Id. at 48 ("We hold that the traditional negligence doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur generally is not applicable in a strict products liability case. We adopt, how-
ever, the "indeterminate product defect test' established in Section 3 of the
Restatement (Third) . . .in cases that do not involve a shifting of the burden of
persuasion.").
77 Id. at 55.
7s Id. at 52 (noting NewJersey's acceptance of the doctrine under which ajury
may infer a product defect, as stated in Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 326
A.2d 673, 678 (N.J. 1974)).
79 Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 55.
80 Id.
81 As of the date this article was prepared, the New.Jersey Supreme Court has
published no less.than four decisions in which provisions of the Restatement
(Third) are discussed. See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1256-57
(N.J. 1999) (comparing Section 6 (pertaining to prescription drugs) to the New
Jersey Product Liability Act and concluding that the learned intermediary doc-
trine is not applicable to circumstances where the drug was directly marketed to
consumers); Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 315 (N.J. 1999)
(discussing Restatement (Third) Section 12's rejection of the product-line excep-
tion that New Jersey has adopted); Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d
967 (N.J. 1998) (finding the Restatement (Third)'s Section 2 consistent with the
law of New Jersey, to the extent it requires plaintiff to prove the availability of a
reasonable alternative design).
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(Third). Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., Inc. 1 2 involved the
scope of a component part manufacturer's liability for an acci-
dent that arose when plaintiff's arm was crushed by a conveyor-
belt system. Plaintiff directed his products liability claims not
only to the system's manufacturer, but also to the manufacturer
of a wing pulley incorporated into the system."3 The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment of the pulley compo-
nent manufacturer, noting that case law supported the notion
that a component part manufacturer is not responsible for inju-
ries sustained due to defectiveness of the final integrated prod-
uct."4 Recognizing that the trial court had not considered the
"recently published" Restatement, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island took the "opportunity to do so" on review, and adopted
in full Section 5 of the Restatement (Third).15 The court af-
firmed on the basis that a component part manufacturer is not
liable for defects in the final integrated product unless such
manufacturer "substantially participate[d] in the integration of
the component into the design of the final product.""
B. STATES THAT EXPRESSLY HAVE REJECTED SECTIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
The second category consist of those states that expressly have
rejected various aspects of the Restatement (Third). This group
consists of Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
and Tennessee. Although New Jersey also was one of the states
in the first category-on the basis of its adoption of the "indeter-
minate product defect" standard of Section 3 as described
above,87 its endorsement did not extend to the Restatement as a
whole. In Lefever v. K.P. Hovnamian Enterprises, Inc.,"8 the Su-
82 733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999); see also Ruzzo v. LaRose Enter., 748 A.2d 261, 266
n.6 (R.I. 2000) (noting in support of the lower court's analysis of the Restatement
(Second) § 402A comment m, "Disclaimers, Limitations, Waivers, and Other
Contractual Exculpations as Defenses to Products Liability Claims for Harms to
Persons," that the Restatement (Third) § 18 adopted this section in its entirety).
83 See Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 713.
84 Id. at 715 (citing Moor v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 320 N.W. 2d 927 (S.D. 1982)). The
trial court had required plaintiff to show that there was a defect in the pulley
when it left the pulley manufacturer's control. Id.
85 Id.
86 Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 714-16 ("We adopt the Restatement's conclusions
that the manufacturer or seller of the component part may be liable to the ulti-
mate user, particularly when it has substantially participate[d] in the integration
of the component into the design of the final product.").
87 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing Myrlak).
88 734 A.2d 290 (N.J. 1999).
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preme Court of New Jersey refused to depart from its previous
recognition of the product-line exception to successor liability.89
Recognizing the ALI's rejection of New Jersey's product-line ex-
ception, the court nevertheless held that it would remain with
the "strong minority of states tak[ing] less restrictive positions
on successor liability. '" 9 0
Despite the tremendous potential of the Restatement (Third)
to establish a more uniform body of products liability standards
across the many states, this movement is unlikely to occur
quickly as perhaps best demonstrated by recent decisions from
Missouri. In Newman v. Ford Motor Co.,9 the Supreme Court of
Missouri declined the defendant's suggestion to incorporate the
risk-utility analysis of the Restatement (Third). Defendant Ford
argued that Missouri, a state that follows neither the risk-utility
nor the consumer expectations test, should adopt the risk-utility
standard of Section 2.92 Finding such arguments inapplicable to
the issue presented-whether a jury instruction was proper-
and noting that the ALI had taken "no position regarding the
specifics of how a jury should be instructed,"9 3 the Supreme
Court of Missouri passed on the issue.94
Less than a year after the Missouri Supreme Court in Newman
declined to address the issue of Missouri's standard for deter-
mining whether a product is defective in design, the issue con-
fronted the court once more-this time in a more direct
fashion. In Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.,9  the court once
again was asked to adopt the risk-utility balancing test of Section
2 of the Restatement (Third). In this case, an amicus brief was
filed by the American Association of International Automobile
s9 Under New Jersey's product-line exception, "by purchasing a substantial
part of the [predecessor's] assets and continuing to market goods in the same
product line, a corporation may be exposed to strict liability in tort for defects in
the predecessor's products." Id. at 292; see also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus. Inc. ,
431 A.2d 811, 820-22 (NJ. 1981) (detailing NewJersey's product line exception).
91) Lefever, 734 A.2d at 295 (quoting Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Liability of Successor
for Harm Caused by Defective Products Sold Commercially by Predecessor, 8 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'', 113, 114 (1998)).
9,1 975 S.W. 2d 147 (1998).
92 See id. at 152-53.
93 Id. at 153 n.19 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, Rep. Note, cmt. d, cmt.
e, and Illustr. 6).
94 Id. at 153 ("While this question is surely one of great academic and practical
interest, it is one this Court has repeatedly resisted answering before the issue is
squarely presented.").
95 996 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1999). The dispute arose from a one-vehicle, rollover
accident. Id at 50.
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Manufacturers in which it was argued that the reasonable alter-
native design/risk-utility test should be adopted as the substan-
tive law of Missouri. 6 The supreme court again refused,97
holding that such a standard was against the "force of prece-
dent" and "effectively foreclosed by the enactment of [Mis-
souri's Tort Reform Act] .""
Connecticut also has refused to adopt a section of the Restate-
ment (Third) on the grounds that it was inconsistent with ex-
isting state law. Perhaps indicative of a "consumer expectations"
jurisdiction's loyalty to that standard, and likely foreshadowing
the many hurdles that this potentially-unifying Restatement will
have to overcome, the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected
the very heart of the new Restatement. In Potter v. Chicago Pneu-
matic Tool Co.,99 the court expressly validated Connecticut's
traditional usage of the consumer expectations test in determin-
ing whether a product is defective in design, refusing to adopt
the risk-utility standard as defined in the 1997 Tentative Draft."..
Similar to Connecticut, Kansas recently refused to adopt the
"heart" of the new Restatement - the risk utility analysis."" The
court examined Section 2, Comment i of the Restatement
(Third) and "[found] it wanting." Citing the necessity in Sec-
tion 2 to adopt "the reasonable alternative design standard and
an exclusive risk/utility analysis . . . to determine whether
the . . . product is defective,"' 1 2 the supreme court found the
Restatement was "contrary to the law in Kansas."' 3 Interest-
ingly, the supreme court held that an "adequate warning did not
foreclose a finding that the product is defectively designed," an
idea included in Section 2 and not consistent with Restatement
(Second).1"4 The supreme court was clear, however, that this
holding "[did] not signify the adoption or approval of Com-
96 Id. at 64.
97 Id. at 65 ("This Court again declines the invitation to adopt the reasonable
alternative design/risk-utility theory.").
98 Under Missouri's statutory scheme, defects in products are measured in gen-
eral terms, defining a defective product as one that is "unreasonably dangerous."
Id.
99 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997); see also Flagg v. General Motors Corp., 709
A.2d 1075, 1088 n.47 (Conn. 1998) (finding the position that Restatement
(Third) Section 6 takes on economic loss as persuasive).
100 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333-34.
101 Delaney v. Deere and Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) ("Kansas, how-
ever, adheres to the consumer expectations test.")
102 Id. at 946.
103 Id.
104 Id. The court also rejected Restatement (Second) § 402A. Id.
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ment i or the remainder of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts." 105
Finally, Tennessee and Montana were placed in this category
not for directly rejecting the Restatement but for advocating
principles clearly not aligned with Restatement (Third). The
Supreme Court of Montana forcefully concluded that the state-
of-the-art defense is precluded under Montana law, despite rec-
ognizing that the defense was adopted in the proposed Final
Draft (Oct. 18, 1996) of the Restatement." 6 Likewise, the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee rejected the notion that both a con-
sumer expectation test and a risk/utility test are allowed under
its products liability statute. 10 7 This directly contradicts the Re-
statement (Third)'s endorsement of the risk-utility test. 08 The
Tennessee and Montana decisions only further emphasize the
reluctance of some states to incorporate the Restatement
(Third) into their state law.
C. STATES THAT HAVE CITED AND DISCUSSED THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) IN A SIGNIFICANT MANNER
SHORT OF ADOPTION
The third and final category is comprised of those states that
have cited and discussed the Restatement (Third) in a signifi-
cant way,' 9 but in a manner falling short of an express adoption
or rejection. These states include Alaska, California, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Ver-
mont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Alaska, North Dakota, and Texas all have noted the consis-
tency between their individual state's law and the Restatement
(Third) without expressly adopting the Restatement. In Claiys
105 Delaney, 999 P.2d at 946.
'06 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) ("Despite the
adoption of the state-of-the-art defense in the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Torts: Products Liability (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary Version) (Oct. 18,
1996) ... we choose to continue to adhere to the clear precedent we have hereto-
fore established which focuses on the core principles and remedial purposes un-
derlying strict products liability.").
|07 Ray v. Bic Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 531-33 (Tenn. 1996).
11s Id. at 529 n.4.
1119 This category includes state supreme court cases that not only cited to sec-
tions of the Restatement (Third) but also discussed the sections in a significant
manner.
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v. Ford Motor Co.,1 10 the Supreme Court of North Dakota cited
Section 21 of the Restatement (Third) in full and noted that the
economic harm doctrine, as stated there, was consistent with
North Dakota's products liability law.I' I Finding consistency be-
tween a products liability statute and the express language of a
particular Restatement section without any reference to the Re-
statement's comments, notes and illustrations leaves open the
question as to whether the particular Section has been adopted
in total.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Texas has cited to the Re-
statement (Third) on multiple occasions. As a whole, the Re-
statement (Third) appears to be largely consistent with Texas
law; but it is unclear, however, whether it has been adopted in
full or in part. For example, in Hernandez v. Tokai Corp.,"' the
court compared numerous sections of Texas state law to the Re-
statement (Third) (including the requirement that plaintiff
show a reasonable alternative design) and found them all consis-
tent.1 3 But there is no language in this opinion or other opin-
ions that suggests Texas has fully adopted the referenced
sections.'14 Alaska's Supreme Court has not cited to the Restate-
ment (Third) as frequently as has Texas, but it also has en-
dorsed the Restatement without expressly adopting it. In
General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth,"5 the Supreme Court of
Alaska "explicitly endorse [d] the crashworthiness doctrine as a
valid theory of recovery," citing Section 16, cmt. a of the Pro-
posed Final Draft (dated April 1, 1997).6 Although the su-
preme court's endorsement is a strong one, whether it
110 592 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1999); see also Steiner v. Ford Motor Co., 606 N.W.2d
881, 885 (N.D. 2000) (deciding to apply the economic loss doctrine, supported
by Restatement (Third) § 21 "retroactive[ly] ... [to] further its purpose").
I"' Id. at 578.
112 2 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 1999).
113 Id. at 257 (noting that similar to section 82.005 of the Texas code that
"[t]he Restatement (Third) . . . also makes a reasonable alternative design a
prerequisite to design-defect liability").
114 Id.; see also General Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 594 (Tex.
1999) (recognizing consistency between Texas law and Section 17, under which
plaintiffs conduct is relevant to whether the damages should be reduced, but
noting that plaintiff is under no affirmative duty to discover defects); Hyundai
Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 667 n.23 (Tex. 1999) (citing Section 2,
cmt. n, for the proposition that the proof on a claim for defective design should
be "the same for any legal theory asserted," whether strict liability, negligence, or
breach of implied warranty).
115 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
116 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999).
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encompasses the entirety of Section 16 is an issue ripe for
discussion. ''
In Massachusetts, the supreme court came as close as possible
to adopting a section of the Restatement (Third) without explic-
itly stating it. In 1998, Massachusetts was only one of four states
that took the "position that a manufacturer [will be] charged
with a duty to warn of risks without regard to whether the manu-
facturer knew, or reasonably should have known the risks."" 8
The supreme court considered "the thin judicial support for this
hindsight approach,"' I" and revised their law "in recognition of
the clear judicial trend regarding a duty to warn . . .and the
principles stated in Restatement (Third).1' 121 Despite exten-
sively relying on the Restatement (Third), the absence of an ex-
press adoption leaves many issues open for future debate.
With less intensity than the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp.
Corp.,' 2 1 considered the effect of the open and obvious danger
rule on plaintiff's products liability claim against a manufacturer
of a fertilizer spreader truck. The court held that such rule "is
not controlling in a case where, as here, it is alleged that a prod-
uct has a design defect."'12 2 In so holding, the court noted that a
preliminary version of the Restatement (Third) had been relied
on in the earlier decision in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc, 123 in
which the contours of the "open and obvious danger" rule were
promulgated. 24 Like the opinions of many supreme courts in
this third category, it remains unclear whether Ogletree will be
read as incorporating, in wholesale fashion, the particular provi-
sion at issue.12
5
'17 Id. at 1212 n.1. Somewhat surprisingly, the supreme court reached the
crashworthiness doctrine "endorsement" even though defendant did not contest
plaintiffs ability to recover under the crashworthiness theory. Id.
-, Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922 n.17 (Mass. 1998).
The other states that took this position were Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton. Id. at 922 n.17 (citing The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
§ 2(c) cmt. m, (1998) reporter's note).
I ld. at 922.
120 Id. at 923.
121 500 S.E. 2d 570 (Ga. 1998).
122 Id. at 571.
123 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994).
1 Ogletree, 500 S.E.2d at 571.
125 See also Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E. 2d 518 (Ga.
1997) (finding the Restatement (Third) consistent with Georgia law, the court
cited Tentative Draft No. 2 for the proposition that "a product's compliance with
an applicable product safety statute or regulation is properly considered in deter-
154
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New York and Wisconsin have relied heavily on the Restate-
ment for support of their current laws, without adoption. The
Court of Appeals of New York has cited the Restatement with
approval on at multiple occasions; for example, in City of New
York v. Pfizer & Co., 126 the court stated in dictum that if the
"product line" theory of successor's liability was brought before
the court, it would not be adopted because it is "a radical
change from existing law" and cited the Restatement (Third),
Section 12, comment b in support of this proposition. 127 Simi-
larly, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,' 28
the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited Section 21 of the Restate-
ment (Third) as "further support for [its] holding" that tort re-
covery is not available for damage to the product itself.129 These
states appear to endorse principles of the Restatement (Third),
but only time will tell whether these endorsements will lead to
adoption of specific Restatement sections.
Finally, four additional states have cited to the Restatement
(Third) significantly but have not expressly adopted any of its
provisions. 130 For example, even though the Supreme Court of
Wyoming in Campbell v. Studer, Inc. 31 endorsed Section 2 of the
Restatement (Third) and its requirement that plaintiff show an
alternative design as a necessary element to the design defect
analysis, it elected to not join the "extensive debate" because
plaintiff there had shown that a feasible alternative design was
indeed available.1 32 Similarly, in Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp.
Corp.,' 33 although the Supreme Court of Vermont noted that the
ALI had incorporated comparative fault principles into Tenta-
mining whether a product is defective, but does not necessarily preclude as a
matter of law a finding of product defect").
126 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3627, at *1 (N.Y. 1999).
127 Id. at 25. See also Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679,
682 (citing Section 2, cmt. f, as allowing ajury to consider the "additional perti-
nent factor" of "the likely effects of [liability for failure to adopt] the alternative
design on... the range of consumer choice among products"); Liriano v. Hobart
Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 307 n.10 (N.Y. 1998) (finding Section 10 generally consis-
tent with New York's recognition of a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn).
128 592 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 1999).
129 Id. at 216.
130 The four states are California, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Wyoming.
131 970 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 1998).
132 Id. at 392 n.1.
133 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1996).
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tive Draft No.1 of the Restatement (Third) ... and that the court
in Webb adopted comparative liability in principle in product lia-
bility actions, it was unable to resolve whether liability should be
precluded if plaintiff was greater than fifty percent at fault.'35
The supreme courts of California and Oklahoma have in-
cluded some extensive discussion of the Restatement (Third) in
dissenting opinions. In Carlin v. Upjohn Co., the California Su-
preme Court was faced with deciding the scope of a prescription
drug manufacturer's duty to warn.'36 The court held that the
manufacturer has a duty to warn the user about the "known or
reasonably scientifically knowable dangerous propensities of its
product."'13 7 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard cited the
Restatement (Third)'s Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 13, 1995)
as taking an intermediate position with regard to a prescription
manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate user. 3 " In Edwards v.
Basel Pharmaceuticals"', the dissenting Justice was more forward
in his endorsement of the Restatement (Third). In his dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Opala stated: "I would declare today that
Oklahoma's common law follows the proposed (but not yet
adopted) test of the Restatement (Third) .. .and its pertinent
comments."14 " In support of his endorsement, he commented
that the Restatement (Third) leaves 'jurisdiction[s] free to
shape the outer limit of liability."' 4 Although dissenting opin-
ions and mere mentions of the Restatement (Third) obviously
are not controlling law, they represent a continuing intellectual
dialogue that ultimately may lead to more widespread adoption
of the Restatement's rationale and provisions.
1:14 See id. at 348 ("[T]he tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
provides for apportioning liability between the plaintiff and the manufacturer or
seller.").
''35 Id. at 343.
1',' 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996).
137 Id. at 1348.
1.18 Id. at 1357-59.
1-19 33 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997) (dissenting opinion).
I- id. at 304 (citing dissenting opinion).
14' Id. Justice Opala's statement in entirety was as follows: "I would declare
today that Oklahoma's common law follows the proposed (but not yet adopted)
text of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ... and its pertinent
comments. Inasmuch as in cases that are not federally pre-empted the proposed
Restatement leaves each jurisdiction free to shape the outer limit of liability, I
would announce that because compliance with a nonpre-emptive federally re-
quired warning constitutes no more than evidence of the manufacturer's reasonable
conduct, it may not by itself be regarded as a liability-defeating defense." Id.
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In summary, based on prior experience with the process of
adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) by the
highest courts of the states, it appears that the process of consid-
eration of the Restatement (Third) will be extremely slow. Per-
haps more problematically, the Restatement's movement of the
law also is likely to encounter great barriers, such as those exem-
plified by the decisions in Connecticut and Missouri. Whether
these barriers stand permanently between the Restatement
(Third) and its potential to unify what is now a very complex
and inconsistent body of State law is impossible to predict.
Based on the preliminary mixed reaction of the states, the only
certainty at this point is that the journey toward widespread
adoption of the Restatement, even if ultimately successful, will
be long and arduous.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY ON AVIATION LITIGATION
While the Restatement (Third) of course does not have the
force of law in any state until adopted by the courts of that juris-
diction, historically prior Restatements have had great impact
on the various state and federal courts and their decisions. If
adopted by the states as universally as was its predecessor, the
Restatement (Third) will undoubtedly shift the legal landscape
of aviation products liability actions, particularly those cases
brought by plaintiffs under a strict liability theory of recovery for
design defects and inadequate warnings or instructions.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the
possible applicability of each of the Restatement (Third) 's provi-
sions to the myriad of legal issues that can arise in the context of
a typical aviation products case, we can start the discussion by
pointing to the provisions that likely will arise with frequency in
aviation cases. Before turning to specific provisions, however,
we should note that the most probable point of contention in
aviation cases, as in all other areas of law, is the concept that
runs through all the provisions of the new Restatement-rea-
sonableness. As courts begin to address the "twisting and some-
times misdirected course of [a] runaway calf,"' 4 and as the
respective bars begin to use the Restatement (Third) to their
advantage, without a doubt there will be substantial discussion
of the ALI's interjection of negligence principles (i.e., foresee-
142 See supra n. 2-5 and accompanying text.
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ability and reasonableness) into legal reasoning and decisions
that since 1965 in many jurisdictions have come to apply "strict
products liability" to all categories of defect, whether arising
from manufacture, design, or inadequate warnings or
instructions.
To begin this analysis, it is essential to recognize that the Re-
statement (Third) is the ALI's first product in a long-term un-
dertaking to revise and update the 35 year old Restatement
(Second); the Restatement (Third) addresses only the topic of
products liability, and does not discuss the multitude of related
tort topics that also may arise in the context of a typical aviation
products case. For example, the ALI has an ongoing project on
"Apportionment of Liability" (joint and several liability, etc.)L4-
and has plans to address additional (and equally if not more
controversial) tort law projects in the coming years. Pending
the completion of these additional projects, practitioners and
courts must continue to rely on the Restatement (Second); in-
deed, the comments and notes to the Restatement (Third)
make frequent reference to the Restatement (Second) for the
law governing areas that have not yet been addressed in the Re-
statement (Third). With this background, we will move to a
brief discussion of the possible impact of specific Restatement
(Third) provisions on litigation in the United States involving
aviation products.
Section 2, "Categories of Product Defect," is the theoretical
foundation of the Restatement (Third) and has the potential to
alleviate the confusion in the jurisprudence of products liability
that arose from Section 402A's conceptual focus on classical
"manufacturing defects." As discussed in Section I above,
402A's focus on manufacturing defects left it to the states to give
meaning to the ambiguous terms of "defective" and "unreasona-
bly dangerous" in the context of the design defect and inade-
quate warning claims that were not part of the legal landscape
in 1965. Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) addresses the
patchwork of competing approaches that evolved in the states by
maintaining the "product focus" of strict liability without fault
for manufacturing defects, but by applying a standard for design
defects and defects in warnings or instructions that incorporates
fundamental negligence principles. Accordingly, Section 2 re-
quires an independent assessment of the advantages and disad-
vantages of a proposed design change or additional instructions
143 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 96-97.
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or warnings applying the traditional negligence concept of rea-
sonableness. In this manner, Section 2 seeks to require prod-
ucts to have an "optimum" amount of product safety, with the
recognition that some risks cannot be designed out of a product
at a reasonable cost.'44 This is the essence of the "risk-utility"
balancing adopted by the Restatement (Third) for design de-
fects and inadequate warnings and instructions.
Accordingly, if Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) is
adopted and followed, there should be more opportunities for
manufacturing defendants in the aviation industry to introduce
evidence of industry practice and "state-of-the-art" that bears on
whether an alternative design is practicable and reasonable. De-
fendants also should be able to offer proof that their design was
the safest available at the time of sale, considering the technol-
ogy then available. Industry practice evidence also should be
admissible (but not necessarily dispositive) on the issue of availa-
bility of alternative designs, as well as to prove whether the omis-
sion of an alternative design rendered the product not
reasonably safe.' 4 5 These opportunities to introduce evidence
should be significant, especially when considering that as part of
the prima facie proof of a design defect a plaintiff ordinarily will
not be required to produce a prototype of the alternative de-
sign, for example, where expert testimony is available to estab-
lish that a reasonable alternative design could have been
adopted."'
Under the reasonableness test of Section 2(b) of the Restate-
ment (Third), the following five factors should be addressed in
a typical aviation products liability case during the analysis of
whether: (1) a design is reasonably safe; (2) an alternative de-
sign is reasonable; and (3) the omission of the alternative design
feature(s) renders a product not reasonably safe:
(a) the magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm;
(b) the probability of foreseeable risks of harm;
(c) the nature of instructions and warnings accompanying the
product;
(d) the nature and strength of consumer expectations regard-
ing the product (to include expectations arising from product
portrayal and marketing); and
144 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
145 Id. cmnt. d.
146 Id. CMt. f.
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(e) the relative advantages of the product as designed and in
the plaintiffs' proposed reasonable "alternative design" (which
should include analysis of factors such as production costs; ef-
fects on product longevity, maintenance, repair and esthetics;
and the range of consumer choice among products). 47
As discussed in Section II above, Subsection (c) of Section 2
also adopts a reasonableness test for the adequacy of product
instructions and warnings at the time of product sale or distribu-
tion, such as the warnings that typically are contained in a pilot
operating handbook or in an aircraft flight or maintenance
manual. In aviation litigation it should be expected that this
reasonableness test may be more difficult for courts to apply in
the warnings context than in the context of defective designs.'48
It can be very difficult to identify a "perfect" level of detail to be
included in a written product warning or instruction; accord-
ingly, courts should be expected under Section 2 (c) to focus on
a variety of factors in applying the proposed test of reasonable-
ness to the adequacy of warnings and instructions for aviation
products, including: (1) content and comprehensibility; (2) in-
tensity of expression; (3) the nature of the risk(s) involved; and
(4) the characteristics of the expected user group(s). 49
However, in what is a departure from the law in some states,
under Section 2 of the Restatement (Third), a warning is not an
adequate substitute for a reasonably safe design-that is, "when
a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks can rea-
sonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer de-
sign is required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum
of such risks."'150 Consistent with this approach, the "openness"
and "obviousness" of a risk most likely will not negate the duty of
a manufacturer to provide a safer design under the analysis of
Subsection (b). 15' However, Subsection (c) does not impose a
1'47 Id.
1,11 ,See kESiATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i.
149 RESTATEMENT (TiuRD) § 2. For example, in the context of the appropriate
level of detail to be included in pilot operating handbooks for operators of gen-
eral aviation aircraft, the aircraft manufacturers must consider that the users of
the handbooks will range in aviation knowledge and experience from student
pilots to pilots holding air transport pilot ratings with tens of thousands of hours
of flight experience.
15' RisiATrEMENT (THIRD) § 10 at cmt. 1.
151 Id. As an illustration, many manufacturers of propeller-driven aircraft cur-
rently provide warnings to users to stay clear of propeller blade paths (which
many would consider to be an "obvious risk"), particularly when moving the pro-
peller or during loading and unloading operations. Under the Restatement
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duty to warn about risks that are obvious, nor does it impose
liability under circumstances where a plaintiff would use the
product regardless of the content or absence of a warning or
instruction. 152 As a general rule, a warning that satisfies the re-
quirements of Subsection (c) is not a substitute for a reasonably
safe design under Subsection (b). 53
With respect to the "indeterminate product defect test" of
Section 3, aviation manufacturers should expect this test to be
applied primarily in the context of claims for manufacturing de-
fects. For example, if a gas turbine engine with a history of relia-
ble service were to suffer a catastrophic failure during the first
100 hours of a new engine's operation and became separated
from the aircraft and lost as a result of the catastrophic failure,
this would be a circumstance where application of this test
should be considered. It remains to be seen whether courts will
restrict the application of this section, as intended by the ALI, to
extraordinary circumstances such as in this example, when the
product is lost or completely destroyed in the accident. 154 How-
ever, even under circumstances where this section properly may
be applied, the plaintiff still will have the burden of proving that
the defect existed at the time it left the manufacturer or distrib-
utor's possession. 5
In connection with a court's inquiry into the reasonableness
of a product's design, instructions or warnings under Section 4
of the Restatement (Third), courts should consider as relevant
evidence, but not necessarily conclusive evidence, the aviation
product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute
or administrative regulation, such as the Federal Aviation Regu-
lations ("FARs"). Currently, many courts will not consider such
evidence when plaintiffs proceed only under a strict products
liability theory of recovery. However, with respect to a plaintiff
establishing a defect through an aviation product's noncompli-
ance with a statute or regulation, such as an FAR, a defendant is
presumed to know the law, and lack of knowledge of the statute
or regulation ordinarily is no defense.156
(Third), such warnings arguably would not negate the duty of a propeller or
aircraft manufacturer to provide a safer propeller design that, for example,
would employ a special paint scheme to increase blade visibility.
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmts. j, 1.
153 Id. cmt. 1.
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. b.
155 Id. cmt. d.
156 RESrATEMENT (THIRD) § 4, Rep. Notes to cmt. d.
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Section 5 discusses the liability of component part manufac-
turers, specifically addressing one of the most significant voids
in the law from the Restatement (Second). This new section in
the Restatement (Third) has the potential to be of significance
in many, if not most, cases involving allegations of defect in
products used in aviation, since many aviation products (partic-
ularly turbine and jet engines and aircraft) are composed liter-
ally of hundreds if not thousands of component parts. Under
this Restatement section, a component manufacturer or distrib-
utor will be liable for harm caused by a defect in its own prod-
ucts, but not for defects arising out of the integration of its
component(s) into a final product (such as a turbine engine or
passenger aircraft) unless the manufacturer or distributor par-
ticipated in the integration of the component. Consistent with
this rule, component manufacturers and raw material suppliers
are not required to monitor the development of products into
which their products are incorporated, but are required to pro-
vide instructions and warnings regarding risks associated with
the use of their component products. 57 Moreover, when a so-
phisticated buyer or manufacturer integrates a component part
or raw material into a final product, the component seller or
distributor does not have a duty to warn either the sophisticated
buyer/manufacturer or ultimate consumers of dangers arising
because the component or material is unsuited for the special
purpose to which it is put by the final manufacturer. 1' This
rule should be of particular significance in the context of avia-
tion products, due to the sophistication of most aviation final
product manufacturers.
As discussed in Section II, the Restatement (Second) also did
not address adequately the topic of post-sale duty to warn, which
has become a topic of increasing interest to aviation product
manufacturers in recent years. The post-sale duties to warn set
out in the Restatement's (Third) Section 10 are limited; aviation
manufacturers must beware, however, that broader duties to
warn apply if a product is defective for inadequate warnings or
instructions at the time of original product sale, as addressed in
Section 2(c). Many commentators and courts have concluded
that Section 10 is one of the most favorable provisions of the
Restatement (Third) for plaintiffs.' 59 Section 10 requires a man-
157 RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) § 5 cmt. b.
158 Id.
159. See, e.g., Tracey Blitz Newman, No Post-Sale Duty to Warn, Superior Court: Re-
statement Third Does Not Represent Pennsylvania Law, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, De-
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ufacturer to warn if it "knows or reasonably should know that
the product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or prop-
erty. ' 160 In light of this provision, aviation manufacturers
should consider developing internal processes to address post-
sale duty to warn, including a procedure for alerting and involv-
ing those employees likely to learn about new and significant
risks of harm to product users.
While some cases have suggested that the rationale for imposi-
tion of a post-sale duty to warn should logically extend with
equal force to a post-sale duty to recall, the Restatement rejects
this position or, indeed, the adoption of any broad tort-based
duty to recall. Instead, Section 11 of the Restatement provides
for very limited circumstances under which a duty to recall may
exist, based on the rationale that under most circumstances gov-
ernment agencies, not courts, should be responsible for deter-
mining when recall obligations should exist. Aviation
manufacturers are well familiar with the power of government
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration
in the United States, to order through Airworthiness Direc-
tives161 the recall and modification of a product. Of special in-
terest to aviation manufacturers may be the operation of
provisions of Sections 11 (a) (2) and 11 (b), under which a manu-
facturer who begins but unreasonably does not complete a re-
call may be liable, even when initially there was no requirement
to undertake a product recall. The operation of these provi-
sions of Section 11 may reduce the incentives for an aviation
manufacturer to voluntarily recall a product, and may suggest
that a manufacturer should consider the issuance of post-sale
warnings rather than a recall of a product, depending on the
circumstances.
Section 15, the Restatement (Third)'s provision addressing
causation principles, could be considered a disappointment for
failing to promulgate causation rules. Instead of setting out new
and consistent rules, Section 15 instead makes reference to the
various tort rules as they exist under current state law. Of signif-
icance to many aviation cases, however, is the Section's com-
ment that a plaintiff's misuse of a product can be resolved
"under the prevailing rules and principles governing causation
cember 29, 1999 (discussing the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in
DeSantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d 624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
- RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10.
161 See 14 C.F.R. § 39 (1999).
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or the prevailing rules and principles governing comparative re-
sponsibility, as the case may be."' 6 2 Thus, states will continue to
follow existing rules for burden of proof, causation, and attribu-
tion of responsibility in cases where misuse of the product is at
issue.
Section 16 of the Restatement addresses another of the major
gaps in the Restatement (Second) that is of particular impor-
tance in aviation cases-the failure of the Restatement (Second)
to provide a framework for liability determination in "enhanced
injury" or "crashworthiness" cases. In the aviation context these
crashworthiness cases typically deal with issues such as the de-
sign of the aircraft's restraint system, the fire-retardant qualities
of the aircraft's materials, and the susceptibility of fuel systems
to crash-induced fires or explosions, to name a few examples.
Under Section 16, a plaintiff first must prove the existence of a
defect, as defined in Sections 2, 3 or 4, in order to bring a
crashworthiness claim; and second, must prove that the defect
increased the harm to the plaintiff.
Having met this proof, a plaintiff need not prove by how
much the defect increased the harm; instead, Section 16(c)
places the burden on manufacturers to determine the amount
of additional injury caused by the crashworthiness defect, or else
the manufacturer is responsible for the entire quantum of in-jury. This rule implicitly recognizes that in most cases the proof
of "enhanced injury" is difficult for plaintiffs to make, and more
often than not, a manufacturer is in a better position (by way of
resources, technical expertise, etc.) to determine the amount of
additional injury caused by a defect in their products. It re-
mains to be seen to what extent 'junk science" issues will be
implicated in expert testimony attributing and apportioning
causation of injuries to various defects alleged in aviation
products. "6"
Subsection (d) of Section 16 is of potential significance for
aviation manufacturers because of its adoption of comparative
fault principles in crashworthiness cases. A common issue of
comparative fault that arises in crashworthiness cases, including
162 RESTATEMENT (TIiIRD) § 15 cmt. b. For example, a common defense raised
by aircraft and component manufacturers in general aviation accident cases is
the failure of the aircraft's pilot to follow aircraft operating handbook or flight
manual procedures or commonly recognized safety or operational practices. Sec-
tion 15 preserves the rules for considering such defenses as they exist under cur-
rent state law.
10 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 2, at 95.
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aviation cases, is a plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt. The issue
of the effect of a plaintiff's negligent failure to wear a seatbelt, at
least in the automobile context, is addressed by statute in most
states. In the absence of a statute, this subsection of the Restate-
ment (Third) provides that courts may consider whether a
plaintiff failed to wear a seatbelt, which is somewhat surprising
in light of the large body of case law in the United States that
has rejected consideration of this issue.'"4 In addition, Section
16 permits a court to consider, in a comparative fault analysis,
whether the plaintiff caused the original accident, a position
that also has been rejected in many jurisdictions.16
Finally, Section 17 of the Restatement (Third) (which ad-
dresses apportionment of responsibility among parties to litiga-
tion), if followed, could drastically alter the presentation of
evidence in aviation products cases. In many jurisdictions if a
plaintiff pilot, for example, proceeds only under a strict prod-
ucts liability theory of recovery, manufacturing defendants may
be excluded from presenting evidence of the pilot's compara-
tive negligence and the contribution of the pilot's negligence to
the occurrence of the accident. Subsections (a) and (b) provide
for reduction of recoverable damages if a plaintiff's conduct is
negligent and combines with product defect to cause harm to
the plaintiff, according to the "generally applicable rules appor-
tioning responsibility" in that jurisdiction.'
As discussed above, the ALI has an ongoing project as part of
its drafting of the entire Restatement (Third) to address appor-
tionment of liability.'" 7 The content of Section 17 and its com-
ments are likely to be superceded by this apportionment of
liability project when it is completed. Until then, how this com-
parative fault regime will be applied in jurisdictions that cur-
rently would exclude evidence of pilot negligence in strict
products liability actions alleging design defects or defect due to
inadequate warnings or instructions remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Among the most emotional and controversial topics in the
field of tort law today is the extent to which the civil justice sys-
tems of the United States are out of control in their handling of
164 RESTATEMENT (TiiRD) § 16 cnt. f.
165 Id.
166 RESTATEMENT (TIRD) § 17.
167 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 96.
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products liability litigation. As a result, reform efforts have been
underway for several years on multiple fronts, including in state
and federal legislatures. While these reform efforts have been
underway, the American Law Institute chose products liability as
its first topic area in tort law to be revised and updated. The
ALI's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability unquestionably
attempts to clarify and constrict the scope of strict products lia-
bility as it has developed since the issuance of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965. The extent to which the
highest courts of the states will accept and adopt the concepts
and specific provisions of the ALI's Restatement (Third) still is
uncertain, although preliminary reactions of the courts indicate
that there is a substantial resistance from some jurisdictions to
the direction chosen by the ALI. The Restatement (Third) nev-
ertheless shows great promise for restoring the needed predict-
ability, consistency, and rationality to this area of the law.
